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United States' Contiguous Zone-Didn't
Someone Say This Had Something
to Do with Pollution?
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 2, 1999, President Clinton issued Proclamation No.
72191 (hereinafter "Proc. 7219"), which extended the United States'
contiguous zone from twelve-miles to twenty-four miles.2 In a coincid-
ing White House policy statement on Proc. 7219, the move was touted
as "strengthening [the United States'] ability to enforce environmental,
customs, and immigration laws at sea by expanding a critical enforce-
ment zone."3 In the statement, Vice President Gore is quoted as saying,
"[w]ith this new enforcement tool, we can better protect America's
working families against drug trafficking, illegal migration, and threats
to our ocean environment. We are putting would-be smugglers and pol-
luters on notice that we will do everything in our power to protect our
waters and our shores."
4
Proc. 7219 was the third presidential proclamation since 1983 to
extend an aspect of the United States' control over its coastal waters. 5
These proclamations illustrate the United States' practice regarding the
international law of the sea (hereinafter "LOS"), and shed light on how
the United States views the various LOS conventions, as well as existing
customary international law on the LOS. This Article analyzes Proc.
7219's impact, if any, on the United States' criminal jurisdiction over
1. Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Sept. 28 1999), reprinted as amended in
Proclamations, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter Proc. 7219].
2. Various treaties and commentators define the term "contiguous zone." Note that any belt
of ocean adjoining the territorial sea could be considered "contiguous." The pertinent treaty
definitions will be discussed infra. At this stage, consider one scholarly definition of the term: "a
zone of sea contiguous to and beyond the territorial sea in which States have limited powers for
the enforcement of customs, fiscal, sanitary and immigration laws." R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V.
LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 103 (1983).
3. Press Release, Office of the Vice President, Vice President Al Gore Announces New
Action to Help and Preserve U.S. Shores and Oceans (Sept. 2, 1999) (on file with author).
4. Id.
5. In 1983, President Reagan issued Proclamation No. 5030, declaring the existence of the
U.S. exclusive economic zone (hereinafter "EEZ"). Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,601
(1983) [hereinafter Proc. 5030]. In 1988, he issued Proclamation No. 5928, extending the U.S.
territorial sea from three to twelve miles. Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1988),
reprinted in Proclamations, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter Proc. 5928].
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foreign vessel-source pollution6 under the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act7 (hereinafter "FWPCA") seaward of the three-mile territorial
sea.' The Article analyzes the FWPCA through the lens of international
law, which President Clinton cited as authority for extending the United
States' contiguous zone.
Part II outlines the international law development of the contiguous
zone and its relationship with state enforcement of pollution regulations
and laws within the contiguous zone. Part III lays out the pertinent
domestic legislation. Part IV applies the foundation set out in Parts II
and III to provide an understanding of the current state of the interna-
tional LOS from the United States' perspective. It then analyzes the
impact of Proc. 7219 on the FWPCA, and concludes it has none. Part V
outlines recommendations for amending the FWCPA to incorporate
Proc. 7219 and to better reconcile it with international law.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT
A. Pre-United Nations Conventions on Law of the Sea:
The Contiguous Zone
From the early seventeenth century until the end of the nineteenth
century, the seas "were largely subject to a "laissez-faire" regime:
beyond the narrow belt of coastal seas [subjected to control by the litto-
ral state'], the high seas were open to the free and unrestricted use by
6. The Law of the Sea Convention addresses three main categories of marine pollution:
pollution from land-based (including air-borne), seabed, and vessel sources. 1 JOHN W. KINDT,
MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 195-98 (1986).
7. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (FWCPA) of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
8. Proc. 5928 extended the U.S. territorial sea from three to twelve miles seaward from the
U.S. coast. Included in this proclamation was a disclaimer (a similar one is in Proc. 7219) stating
that: "[n]othing in this Proclamation: (a) extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State law
or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom .... " 54 Fed. Reg. 77,
Note 43 U.S.C. § 1331. The effect of Proc. 5928 was to extend the U.S. territorial sea for
international law purposes only. Domestic laws referencing the territorial sea would continue to
interpret the territorial sea as three miles seaward from the coast, until (or unless) Congress
redefined the territorial sea as twelve miles seaward from the coast. This results in a patchwork
application of the territorial sea, depending on the context. In some contexts, the territorial sea is
defined as three miles. See, e.g., the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8)
(1994). In others, the territorial sea is defined as twelve miles. See, e.g., The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, P.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). In a third context,
the territorial sea is referred to, yet not defined. For problems that may result due to the ill-
defined territorial sea, see United States v. One Big Six Wheel, 166 F.3d 498 (2d Cir. 1999).
9. In this Article, the term "littoral state" is used to generically define a state bounding an
ocean. Distinguish this term from "coastal state," which is a term used in various conventions to
denote a state bounding an ocean or sea but with certain applicable rights derived from the
respective convention. See, e.g. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, art. 2, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter TSC], and Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Nov. 16, 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC].
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all."" The origin of the contiguous zone as a zone of limited control or
jurisdiction beyond a state's sovereign territorial sea has its roots in the
divergence from this laissez-faire regime by the United Kingdom's hov-
ering laws" and late eighteenth-century United States' anti-smuggling
laws.' 2  In 1876, the United Kingdom returned to the laissez-faire
regime by recognizing the establishment of the three-mile territorial sea
under international law,13 and abolishing its anti-smuggling law to con-
form to this view.'4 Then, until the 1950s, the United Kingdom consist-
ently opposed any sort of extended littoral state control or jurisdiction
beyond the three-mile territorial sea, arguing that any further state con-
trol into the high seas would be an unnecessary infringement on freedom
of navigation.1 5
However, by the early 1900s, state practice 16 and scholarly atten-
tion began moving forward the idea of a zone of limited jurisdiction or
control seaward of the territorial sea, to be exercised by a coastal state. 17
Most of the early attempts to codify the customary international law of
the sea were taken by non-governmental learned societies. 18 Masterson
argued for the concept by examining the interests at stake in effectuating
the contiguous zone concept:
[w]hat interest, if any, is there to be weighed against this tangible
interest of the littoral state in protecting its revenue and in maintain-
ing law and order near its coasts? There are no interests of the flag
state19 or any interest of the community of states to be balanced
against the interests of the littoral state, secured by the hovering
laws.2°
10. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 11. See also R.P. Anand, Winds of Change in the
Law of the Sea, LAW OF THE SEA 37 (R.P. Anand, ed. 1978).
11. See W.E. MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
SMUGGLING 3 (1929).
12. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, § 25, 1 Stat. 627.
13. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PEACE 205 (Sir Humphrey Waldcock, ed., 6th ed. 1963).
14. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 112.
15. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION
11, 17-18 (1927). In the 1950s the United Kingdom participated and espoused extending to a
coastal state's jusrisdiction for limited purposes. See Shigera Oda, The Concept of the Contiguous
Zone, 11 Am. J. INT'L L. 135, 140 (1962).
16. Several Latin American states (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico) as well as
Egypt, Latvia, and Norway, had laws enabling their right to police for customs and 3ecurity
purposes only. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 113.
17. See Oda, supra note 15, at 148. For an example of learned society consideration and
acceptance of the concept, see The Harvard Law School Research in International Law Draft
Convention on the Law of Territorial Waters, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 243 (Supp. 1929) [hereinafter
Draft Convention].
18. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 11.
19. A flag state is the state whose nationality the ship claims.
20. W.E. MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN THE MARGINAL SEAS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
2001]
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This balance concerning the contiguous zone, and other zones of juris-
diction and/or control with shipping interests, is a concept that interna-
tional law, and this Comment, will return to.
It is necessary to understand what a state could do in this zone to
effectuate its jurisdiction or control. Both the American Society of
International Law, and the League of Nations, addressed the concept in
roughly equal terms while attempting to articulate the international legal
status of the high seas and territorial seas. Although neither came to an
ultimate conclusion about the types of control or jurisdiction a littoral
state could exercise, both addressed the same vessel infractions that
could permit a state to take action, as well as the extent of that state
action. It is worth examining their efforts to determine how the relation-
ship, if any, between the contiguous zone and pollution, was viewed by
those involved in the early efforts to codify the international law of the
sea.
In 1929, in preparation for the League of Nations Conference on
the Codification of International Law, the Research in International Law
of the Harvard Law School2' drafted a Convention on The Law of Terri-
torial Waters. 2   The draft divided the ocean into two legal environ-
ments: territorial waters and high seas. 3 Under the draft, the coastal
state was to have sovereignty over its territorial waters, subject to inno-
cent passage by foreign vessels.2 4 It also provided, in Article 20, for a
zone of coastal state "control," analogous to the present-day concept of a
contiguous zone.2 Article 20 states that:
The navigation of the high sea is free to all states. On the high sea
adjacent to the marginal sea, however, a state may take such mea-
sures as may be necessary for the enforcement within its territory or
territorial waters of its customs, navigation, sanitary, or police laws
or regulations, or for its immediate protection.26
By plain reading, the terms of Article 20 are vague. No maximum
permissible distance from the coast is given for littoral state action.
Also, the phrase "such measures" would seem to allow intercept of
SMUGGLING (1929), quoted in Shigeru Oda, The Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 11 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 131, 136 (1962).
21. See Draft Convention, supra note 17.
22. Id. at 241.
23. See Draft Convention, supra note 17, arts. 1, 4, at 243. The "territorial waters" were
defined as a state's "marginal sea" and internal waters. Id. at 244.
24. Id., art. I cmt., at 249; id. art. 14 cmt., at 244; id. at 295.
25. Id. art. 20 cmt., at 333-34.
26. Id. art. 20, at 245. The categories addressed in Article 20, customs, navigation, sanitation,
and security (as noted by the phrase "for its immediate protection"), as well as immigration and
fiscal laws, will be addressed repeatedly in international discussions on sources of action allowing
states to exercise jurisdiction or control in their contiguous zone.
[Vol. 55:487
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either an outbound offending vessel having just crossed a territorial sea,
or an inbound vessel that would be committing an offense once it arrived
in the littoral state's territorial seas. Thus, without delving into the
intent of these early efforts, a plain reading interpretation suggests that
states would be permitted to act in an indeterminate way for an indeter-
minate distance on the high seas to enforce certain defined categories of
laws that would be offensive if committed within its territorial sea.
The 1930 League of Nations Conference on the Codification of
International Law (hereinafter "Hague Conference"), meeting at The
Hague, struggled with codification of the territorial sea and contiguous
zone. Discussions regarding the contiguous zone yielded diverse
views over its existence and form, but it ultimately failed as a basis of
compromise to bridge the gap between those states that wanted adher-
ence to a three-mile maximum territorial sea and those who wanted a
greater breadth. However, the Report of the Conference's Second Com-
mittee (Territorial Sea) provides insight into how this conference viewed
the nature of the contiguous zone and whether pollution was considered
as grounds for state action. The first issue considered by the committee
regarding the contiguous zone was the rights of coastal states within the
zone. Views diverged on whether a coastal state's enforcement of its
customs laws was better served by a collective convention or regional/
bilateral instruments, and whether enforcement of security and sanitation
laws should be included in the convention.
Pollution is not one of the categories listed as debated in the 1930
Hague Convention 28 or the 1929 Harvard Research meeting.29  It
appears that the Research did not consider "sanitary" or "sanitation" to
include pollution. Brief anecdotal evidence of this is found in the
Report of the Second Committee (Territorial Sea) of the Hague Conven-
tion.30 The report listed three territorial sea regimes that the Preparatory
Committee used to query participating nations about their preference.
The third regime provided:
Acceptance of the principle of a zone on the high sea contiguous to
the territorial sea in which the Coastal State would be able to exercise
the control necessary to prevent, within its territory or territorial sea,
the infringement of its Customs or sanitary regulations or interference
with its security by foreign vessels, such control not to be exercised
27. See Jesse S. Reeves, The Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters, 24 AM. J. INT'L L.
486, 491-94 (1930).
28. See generally Report of the Second Committee (Territorial Sea), Acts of the Conference
for the Codification of International Law, League of Nations Doc. C 351(b) 1930V (1930),
reprinted in 24 AM J. INT'L L. 1, 234-58 (Supp. 1930) [hereinafter Second Committee Report].
29. See generally Draft Convention, supra note 17, at 249-364.
30. See generally Second Committee Report, supra note 28.
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more than 12 miles from the coast. 3 1
Yet only three paragraphs later, the report notes that under this
scheme "[s]tates would still be free to make treaties with one another
conferring special or general rights in a wider zone-for instance, to pre-
vent pollution of the sea."32 If sanitation laws included pollution, the
use of these different terms for pollution would be unnecessary.
Further evidence may be found in treaties in force at the time. One
example is the 1925 Pan-American Sanitary Code,3 3 which amended an
earlier sanitation convention of the same name.3 4 The subject matter of
both these conventions was the prevention of the spread of communica-
ble diseases. Nowhere in either convention is pollution prevention men-
tioned, either directly or indirectly. This obviously does not preclude
the term later expanding to include pollution, as is discussed below.
This point is merely offered as evidence that the common meaning of
the term sanitary did not encompass pollution in the late 1920s and early
1930s.
The contiguous zone concept, as distinguished from a sovereign
territorial sea, gained momentum in the 1920s as the United States began
enforcing its prohibition laws and The Hague Conference focused
greater attention on the issue.35 After The Hague Conference, states
began either claiming their own contiguous zones or dropping their
opposition to the contiguous zone.36 Development of the contiguous
zone concept continued through the 1950s, and in 1956 the International
Law Commission (hereinafter "ILC") codified the concept of "territorial
waters."37 The ILC discussions culminated in the First United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter "UNCLOS I"), held for
two months in 1958 in Geneva.38
B. First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
UNCLOS I was heavily influenced by the 1930 Hague Conven-
tion's articles and the ILC's work. The conference resulted in four con-
ventions (hereinafter "Geneva Conventions") concerning the world's
oceans, two of which are pertinent here: the Convention on the High
31. Id. at 235.
32. Id. at 235-36.
33. Pan-American Sanitary Convention, Nov. 14, 1924, 44 Stat. 2031, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
34. Pan-American Sanitary Convention, Oct. 14, 1905, 35 Stat. 2094.
35. A.V. Lowe, The Development of the Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 52 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 109, 110 (1982).
36. Id. at I10-11.
37. See 1949 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 43. The development of the contiguous zone is explored
further in Section lI.B.ii. infra.
38. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 13.
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Seas, and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.39
These two conventions will be examined to determine how they gener-
ally provided for coastal and flag state jurisdiction, specifically with
regard to the contiguous zone and pollution.
The balance of jurisdiction generally set in the conventions is fairly
straightforward: coastal states have sovereignty over their territorial seas
subject to the right of innocent passage and flag states have almost
unrestricted jurisdiction on the high seas.4"
1. CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS
The Convention on the High Seas (hereinafter "HSC") was the first
successful attempt to codify the rules of international law pertaining to
the high seas.41 It defines "high seas" as "all parts of the sea that are not
included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state."42 The
HSC reflects then-current international law by recognizing only two sui
generis bodies of water: the high seas and states' territorial seas and
internal waters.
The HSC recognizes a coastal state's right to commence hot pursuit
from either its territorial sea or contiguous zone for infractions against
the coastal state's laws.43 Pursuit from the contiguous zone is allowed
only if the infractions sought to be punished are in "violation of the
rights for the protection of which the zone was established."44 To give
this phrase practical meaning, this provision would allow, for instance,
pursuit from the contiguous zone to be executed by the coastal state if
the pursuit was to punish an offending ship for violation of the state's
fiscal, immigration, sanitary, or customs regulations while that ship was
in the state's territorial sea. 5 This application demonstrates the nature
39. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. II
[hereinafter HSC]; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 9. The
other two conventions were the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, 499 U.N.T.S. 312 and Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. It is interesting that, as of 1982,
only a quarter of the world's nations accepted the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, and half of those were land-locked states. A. Mpazi Sinjela, Freedom of
Transit and The Right of Access for Land-Locked States: The Evolution of Principle and Law, 12
GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 31, 43 n.67 (1982).
40. ERIK JAAP MOLENAAR, COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION OVER VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION
46 (1998). UNCLOS H was convened in 1960 for the express purpose of determining a maximum
limit to the territorial sea. It failed by one vote to establish a regime allowing a maximum 6-mile
territorial sea with a maximum six-mile contiguous fishing zone. DAVID J. ATrARD, THE
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1987).
41. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 183-84 n.3 (3d ed. 1979).
42. HSC, supra note 39, art. 1, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82.
43. Id. art. 23, at 2318-19, 94-96.
44. Id.
45. HSC, supra note 39, art. 24, 13 U.S.T. at 2319, 450 U.N.T.S. at 96.
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of the contiguous zone: a zone over which the coastal state may exercise
control to prevent or punish infractions of those laws that would be
offensive in its territorial sea. Distinguish this from the concept of a
state exercising sovereignty within a particular zone: the state may not
punish an offending ship for violations within the contiguous zone per
se. It could, however, prevent from entry into its territorial sea an
inbound ship conducting what would be infractions of fiscal, immigra-
tion, sanitation or customs laws had the ship been in the state's territorial
sea. This concept will be addressed further in the context of the Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the Law of the
Sea Convention.
Aside from acknowledging coastal state rights as just described, the
HSC's main purpose is to delineate acceptable vessel action on the high
seas,46 and to lay out flag state responsibility in the administration of
vessels flying its flag on the high seas. 4 It recognizes the traditional
freedoms enjoyed by all states on the high seas, including the freedoms
of navigation, fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines, and over-
flight.48 Every state "has the right to sail ships under its flag on the high
seas."49 Ships are thus subjected to the flag state's exclusive jurisdic-
tion, except for where treaties or the HSC provide otherwise.50
Marine environmental protection was not a significant issue at
UNCLOS 1.51 There is no expressed general duty calling for preserva-
tion and protection of the marine environment. 2 The HSC contains two
articles regarding pollution, articles 24 and 25.11 Article 24 states that:
46. E.g., id. Ships shall fly under the flag of only one state and may not change flags during a
voyage (art. 6), piracy defined (art. 15), warships are allowed to approach and board vessels
suspected of piracy, slave trading, or if vessel refuses to show its flag, to check if it is the same
nationality as the warship (art. 22).
47. E.g., id. states shall take measures for its ships to ensure safety at sea (art. 10), in event of
collision involving penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master, only the flag state or the state
of which that person is a national may institute proceedings (art. 11), states shall require masters
of its ships to render assistance to persons and ships as necessary and shall promote establishment
and maintenance of adequate and effective search and rescue service (art. 12), states shall adopt
effective measures to prevent and punish slave transport (art. 13), states shall co-operate for the
repression of piracy (art. 14), States shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution by oil from its
ships (art. 24).
48. HSC, supra note 39, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82.
49. Id. art. 4, at 2315, 84.
50. Id. art. 23, at 2318-19, 95-96. Article 23 provides one exception: in the case of hot
pursuit that continues into the high seas after beginning in a coastal State's territorial sea. The
1969 Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties
was an example of a treaty exception. Done Nov. 29, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 765 (entered into force
May 6, 1975).
51. MOLENAAR, supra note 40, at 46.
52. Compare this with LOSC, supra note 9, art. 192, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 477.
53. HSC, supra note 39, arts. 24-25, at 406-07.
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"[e]very state shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas
by the discharge of oil from ships and pipelines . . . taking account of
existing treaties on the subject."54 This language, taking into account
the concept of generally exclusive flag state jurisdiction over ships fly-
ing its flag, requires states to enact regulations governing the conduct of
ships flying that state's flag.
The reference to existing treaties is a reference55 to the 1954 Con-
vention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. 56 This conven-
tion, as it stood when the HSC was signed, set up "prohibited zones"
where discharges from tankers (and other ships meeting certain criteria)
were prohibited. As a general rule, the prohibited zones extended up to
fifty miles from the coast. A 1962 amendment expanded the prohibited
zones in some cases out to one hundred miles.57 It called for the flag
state to punish not only oil discharges within fifty or one hundred miles
as applicable, but also prohibited larger ships (non-naval ships greater
than 20,000 tons) constructed after entry of the amendment into force in
1967 from discharging oil or oily mixtures anywhere in the ocean. 8
The second pollution provision is Article 25, which requires coop-
eration with the International Maritime Commission for the prevention
of ocean pollution resulting from activities with radioactive materials.59
Articles 24 and 25 apparently reflect the two apparent main concerns of
the day about marine pollution: oil and nuclear pollution from ships.
Thus, the structure of the HSC allocates near-exclusive jurisdiction
over vessels sailing the high seas in the state whose flag the vessel flies,
subject to exceptions which open it to universal jurisdiction 60 or which
provide for continuation of hot pursuit started from a coastal state's ter-
ritorial sea or contiguous zone.61 By the provisions of the HSC, states
have an express general obligation to prevent marine pollution through
54. HSC, supra note 39, art. 24, 13 U.S.T. at 2319, 450 U.N.T.S. at 96.
55. Yoram Dinstein, Oil Pollution by Ships and Freedom of the High Seas, 3 J. MAR. L.
COMM. 363, 369 (1972).
56. 3 U.S.T. 2989 (1961). The Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
has been superseded, as between States that are parties to both, by the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319, and Protocol of
1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973,
adopted Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78]. Both the Convention and
1978 Protocol make a single instrument.
57. E.g., the 1962 amendment does not apply to naval vessels, or ships under 150 or 500 tons,
depending on their classification by the '54 Oil Convention.
58. Dinstein, supra note 55, at 367.
59. HSC, supra note 39, art. 25, 13 U.S.T. at 2319, 450 U.N.T.S. at 96.
60. For universal prohibition against slave trade, see HSC, supra note 39, arts. 13, 22; for
universal prohibition against piracy, see id., arts. 14-22, 13 U.S.T. at 2317-18, 450 U.N.T.S. at 90-
94.
61. Id. art. 23, 13 U.S.T. at 2318-19, 450 U.N.T.S. at 94-96.
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regulation of ships flying their flag, while those states also party to the
1954 Oil Pollution Prevention Convention62 have a specific obligation to
do the same.
2. CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (here-
inafter "TSC") codifies international law applicable to the territorial sea
and contiguous zone.6 3 It establishes the coastal state's sovereignty
beyond its land territory and into a belt of ocean adjacent to its shore,6 4
and into the airspace over that ocean belt. 65 The right of innocent pas-
sage of foreign vessels through the territorial sea limits this sover-
eignty.66 The principal sections of the TSC include the establishment of
the coastal state's sovereignty over the territorial sea, delineation of the
territorial sea, to include limits and guidance for designating baselines
from which to measure the territorial sea, rules regarding innocent pas-
sage, and the contiguous zone.
Article 24 sets the outer limit of a state's contiguous zone at twelve
miles from the baseline67 and allows states to "exercise the control nec-
essary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitary laws within its... territorial sea; [or](b) punish infringement of
the above laws ... committed within its ... territorial sea."68 The TSC
makes it clear that the contiguous zone is part of the high seas.6 9
Pertinent to the discussion is 1) the meaning of the term "sanitary;"
and 2) whether or not it includes "pollution;" and thus 3) whether the
contiguous zone may be used by a coastal state as authority to take
action to prevent or punish instances of vessel source marine pollution
within its contiguous zone.
The first point has been a topic of some discussion by commenta-
tors, and the question remains largely unresolved (except for the United
States, which, as discussed in Section IV.C., based a 1970 amendment to
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act on authority stemming from an
interpretation that "sanitation" laws included "pollution" laws as a sub-
62. Or MARPOL 73fl8, see supra note 56.
63. See supra note 9.
64. TSC, supra note 9, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. at 1608, 516 U.N.T.S. at 206.
65. Id. art. 2, at 1608, 208.
66. Id. art. 14, at 1610, 214.
67. The "baseline" is defined in both TSC, supra note 9, art. 3 and LOSC, supra note 9, art. 5,
as "the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the
coastal State." Further clarification is provided in LOSC, supra note 9, 1833 U.N.T.S. arts. 7-15,
at 401-03.
68. Supra note 18.
69. TSC, supra note 9, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. at 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. at 220-22.
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set70). One researcher,71 however, after researching participants' discus-
sions during ILC talks and UNCLOS I in the 1950s, concluded the issue
was all but resolved, at least with regards to the ILC talks. In 1951, the
ILC rejected a proposal, by a tie vote, to authorize a coastal state in a
200-mile contiguous zone to exercise the restrictions "necessary to pre-
vent the pollution of those waters by fuel oil."72 In its final draft arti-
cles, submitted to the United Nations in 1956, the ILC made specific
mention of the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil,73 stating that only an international solution could be effec-
tive, and unilateral state action would be inadequate. As Wulf says:
"[i]n view of Commission's knowledge of the fifty mile prohibited
zones established in the 1954 Convention, the twelve mile contiguous
zone authorized by the draft article on the contiguous zone would not
meet the Commission's view of the threat that oil pollution presented.
7 4
Wulf then examined the UNCLOS I preparatory materials.
Included in these materials were a compilation of laws and a synoptic
table75 listing the breadths of members' claimed territorial seas and adja-
cent zones. 76 The table listed only two countries which included pollu-
tion laws as sanitary laws.77 No other materials connected with
UNCLOS I equated pollution with sanitation. Wulf concluded that it is
doubtful that UNCLOS I intended to equate the two, but rather that it
intended to limit sanitary issues to regulations designed to prevent
importation of disease.78 He notes, however, as evidenced by testimony
before the United States Congress after the close of UNCLOS I, it is
evident that states found enough flexibility to enact measures to enforce
laws in their contiguous zones to protect significant coastal interests.79
70. The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, P.L. 91-221, 84 Stat. 91 (1970).
71. NoRMAN A. WULF, CONTIGUOUS ZONES FOR POLLUTION CONTROL, AN APPRAISAL UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW (SEA GRANT TECHNICAL BULLETIN #13, (1971) (informally published LL.M.
thesis, University of Miami School of Law) (in collection of University of Miami Baron Law
Library).
72. 1951 INT'L L. COMM. Y.B. 308, quoted in WULF, supra note 71, at 143.
73. See supra note 48.
74. WULF, supra note 71, at 145.
75. The synoptic table used by Wulf was actually based on one prepared for use at UNCLOS
II. This second table was based on the original, with updates. Wulf assumed that the second table
was similar to the first, "with only minor changes not affecting the organization of the original
synoptic table." WULF, supra note 71, at 149. Synoptic table, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.19/4,
reprinted in Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea Official Records, Annex, at 157, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CONF.19/8, U.N. Sales No. 60. V. 6 (1960).
76. WULF, supra note 71, at 146-48.
77. Id. at 149-50.
78. Id. at 138, 142, 154-55.
79. Id. at 157-58. Again, he apparently is referring to the U.S. interpretation of "pollution"
being included in the "sanitary" category of laws as justification for an amendment to the
FWPCA.
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This flexibility was the only authority, albeit tenuous, that coastal
states had at that time to assert greater unilateral protection of their
coastal interests. However, as will be discussed, the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (hereinafter "EEZ") regime gives coastal states' increased
authority to ensure protection of their coastal interests through "sover-
eign rights" and "jurisdiction. ' 80 Although this additional authority in
the EEZ is still limited because it is tied to international standards, thus
limiting unilateral state action, coastal states nonetheless have more
power to protect their coastal interests than they did after UNCLOS I.
Thus, the stretched interpretation relied upon by the United States is no
longer needed.
C. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea &
The Law of the Sea Convention8 1
Due in part to the growth within the United Nations of newly inde-
pendent states, which had no say in negotiating the Geneva Conventions,
and increasing concern about overfishing and marine pollution off
states' coasts with no real solutions offered by the Geneva Conven-
tions,8" the United Nations convened the Third Law of the Sea Confer-
ence (hereinafter "UNCLOS III"). It met in ten sessions from 1973 to
1982. The resulting Law of the Sea Convention (hereinafter "LOSC")
was the result of an extraordinary process of international diplomacy and
efforts.83 The LOSC strikes a balance not only between flag and port
states, but also concerns of coastal states about pollution prevention.
Essentially, the substantive portions of the LOSC purport to bal-
ance the three types of 'interests': the interest of the flag state to use
the seas as a whole for all types of purposes; the interest of a coastal
state in respect of the sea-areas adjacent to its coastline; and the inter-
ests of the international community as a whole, which to a certain
extent coincide with the interest of either a flag state or a coastal state
and, in some respects, are opposed to both. 84
80. See infra Part II.C.3.
81. The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS II") convened
in 1960 to specifically address the issue of territorial sea breadth. It failed to pass a scheme
allowing 6-mile territorial sea with a 6-mile contiguous zone by one vote. ATrARD, supra note 40,
at 13.
82. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 14. See also, e.g., Congo's general statement, Third
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea Official Records, 2nd Sess., 28th mtg. 39-40, U.N. Sales
No. E.75.V.3 (1975) [hereinafter UNCLOS III OR].
83. For an idea of the complexity involved, see ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING THE
NEW OCEAN REGIME 4-6 (1993).
84. W. Riphagen, Dispute Settlement in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, in The New Law of the Sea. SELECTED AND EDITED PAPERS OF THE ATHENS COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, SEPTEMBER 1982 218-301 (C.L. Rozakis and C.A. Stephanou, eds.,
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The coastal states brought pressure to bear after their pollution con-
cerns were heightened by a new generation of supertankers began tran-
siting off their coasts.85 As a coastal state, a state should not need to
wait, or rely, on an offending ship calling at a port before acting (in
which case it would be acting under its port state jurisdiction); it may
now assert its jurisdiction to (or "its control necessary to . . .") punish or
prevent the infraction.86
The LOSC opened for signature in 1982, and entered into force in
1994.87 On the date it closed for signatures, 155 nations had signed it.88
As of January 24, 2001, 135 states have ratified, acceded or succeeded
to the LOSC.89 The LOSC is acknowledged to be generally declarative
of international law, and an "umbrella convention" because most of its
provisions are generally worded, and can thus be made actionable only
through specific operative provisions contained in other international
agreements or domestic law.9° The LOSC divides the ocean into numer-
ous ocean "zones," inter alia: the territorial sea and contiguous zone
(covered in LOSC Part II), the exclusive economic zone (LOSC Part V),
the continental shelf (LOSC Part VI), and the high seas (LOSC Part
VII).9' Additionally, the LOSC includes an entire section on marine
pollution (LOSC Part XII).92 A separate section for pollution was cre-
ated distinct from the other sections addressing specified zones because
issues of marine pollution are pertinent in each zone, but covered differ-
ently from an enforcement standpoint depending on the zone where the
pollution occurred. This Comment looks at the structure of the LOSC in
order to discuss the LOSC's treatment of coastal state criminal jurisdic-
tion over vessel-source pollutions in Part IV.
North-Holland, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. 1983) as quoted in MOLENAAR, supra note 40, at
50.
85. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 2. Such supertankers were built to maximize
efficiency as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal during the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. Id.
86. By plain reading it is this authority as coastal state that the FWCPA/OPA '90 appears to
rely upon in the context of vessel source pollution.
87. LOSC, supra note 9, at 394. The President has sent the LOSC to the Senate for its advice
and consent to accession. See S.TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39 (1994). The status of the LOSC
from the U.S. perspective is presented in Part III.B.
88. Table showing the current status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
and of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention, at http://
www.uh.org/Deptsloslos94st.htm (last updated Jan. 24, 2001).
89. MOLENAAR, supra note 40, Annex 3.
90. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Impact
of the Entry into Force of the 1982 United Nations' Convention on the Law of the Sea on Related
Existing and Proposed Instruments and Programmes, 112, U.N. Doc. No. A/52/491 (1997)
(hereinafter UN Impact Report).
91. LOSC, supra note 9.
92. Id.
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1. THE TERRITORIAL SEA
After UNCLOS I and II failed to fix the maximum breadth of a
state's territorial sea, UNCLOS III adopted twelve miles as the maxi-
mum territorial sea breadth.93 Like the TSC, the LOSC provided that
coastal state sovereignty extends over the territorial sea and extends to
the airspace over it and the bed and subsoil below it.94 In this zone,
coastal states exercise full legislative and enforcement jurisdiction to the
extent that they does not affect foreign vessels' right to innocent pas-
sage.95 Willful and serious acts of pollution contrary to the LOSC are
considered prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the
coastal state if done within the territorial sea.96 This does not include
acts of pollution done by the vessel outside a territorial sea that then
affects (e.g., drifts into) the territorial sea.97 Thus, the LOSC allows
93. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 3, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 400.
94. Id. art. 2 at 409. It is appropriate to briefly mention a fundamental difference between the
LOSC and the '58 Geneva conventions. The '58 Geneva conventions codified accepted
international law at that time, and left unsettled what was still unaccepted. ANAND, supra note 10,
at 6. The TSC, HSC, and Convention on the Continental Shelf were based in large measure on
customary international law. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 2, at 13. In effect, at least these
three of the '58 conventions were legal instruments. The LOSC went beyond the scope of the '58
conventions. Indeed, it had to. The laissez-faire regime embodied in the international law of the
sea until UNCLOS III no longesr served the interests of international justice. See ANAND, supra
note 10 at 46; Thomas A. Clingan, Legal Issues of Navigation, PROCEEDIDNGS, MOSCOW
SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 11 (1988). The LOSC was still a legal instrument, but also a
political document, declaring the rule of law as agreed by international consensus. See Bernard H.
Oxman, Summary of the Law of the Sea Convention, in LAW OF THE SEA, U.S. POLICY DILEMMA
24 (Bernard H. Oxman, David D. Caron, Charles L.O. Buden eds., 1983). As such, it contains
elements of both a law-making and codification document. See MOLENAAR, supra note 40, at 50.
The process also enhanced the possibility of acceptance by the majority of state governments,
by offering something for everyone, including, e.g., land-locked states with no coast, maritime
powers that were concerned about the increasing trend of creeping jurisdiction into the high sea
seas by coastal states, and developing states that would receive a share of economic bounty
beyond national jurisdiction. See James E. Bailey III, Comment, The Exclusive Economic Zone:
Its Development and Future in International and Domestic Law, 45 LA. L. REV. 1269, 1269
(1985); David L. Larson, Naval Weaponry and the Law of the Sea, 19 PRoc. L. SEA. INST. 41, 42
(1987).
The LOSC particularly impacted the understanding of state sovereignty. It limited
sovereignty by creating a peaceful dispute settlement system as an integral part of the Convention,
subjecting sovereign rights over resources to the duty of conservation and environmental
protection, and imposing a duty to cooperate on the environment, marine scientific research, and
technology. It transformed sovereignty by disaggregating sovereignty into a bundle of rights on a
scale from "sovereignty" to "jurisdiction" to "control" [even to a greater extent than the Geneva
conventions]. And it transcended sovereignty by declaring the Common heritage of mankind the
seabed beyond national jurisdiction, in effect bestowing Sovereign rights on mankind as a whole:
"The ultimate transcendence of the concept of the Sovereign State." Elisabeth Mann Borgese,
Ocean Governance: Strategies and Approaches for the 21st Century, 28 PROC. L. SEA INST. 35
(Thomas A. Mensah, ed. 1994).
95. LOSC, supra note 9, Part II, sect. 3, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404-10.
96. Id. art. 19(2), at 404-05.
97. Because the language of LOSC art. 19(2) states that such behavior is prejudicial "if in the
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coastal state legislative and enforcement jurisdiction to proscribe and
regulate acts of pollution done within its territorial sea, provided it does
not infringe on innocent passage, which by definition does not include
acts of willful and serious pollution.
2. THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE
The wording of LOSC Article 33, which defines the contiguous
zone, is an almost verbatim of that of TSC Article 24.98 At the time of
the LOSC signing in 1982, the concept of the contiguous zone had
become firmly entrenched in the international law of the sea.99 Like the
definition in the TSC, the LOSC definition does not include an explicit
grant of pollution control or jurisdiction to the coastal state."° Also, the
contiguous zone must be declared.' °1
Article 33(1) provides that within its contiguous zone, coastal states
may exercise that control necessary to prevent infringement of the
coastal state's customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regula-
tions within its territory or territorial sea, or punish infringement of
those laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial
sea. 102 The distinction between "prevent" and "punish" reflects the dif-
ference between inbound and outbound ships, respectively. 0 3 By its
plain language, under the LOSC, a coastal state may not exercise
enforcement jurisdiction over infractions committed within the contigu-
ous zone itself,"°4 unless, 1) an inbound ship acts contrary to a state's
fiscal, immigration, sanitary, or customs laws while in the contiguous
zone and 2) the act would be unlawful in the state's territorial sea, or
would affect the coastal state's territorial sea, or an outbound ship
located in the contiguous zone violated those laws while transiting
through the territorial sea. 05 The question here once again turns on the
issue of whether the word sanitary includes pollution in the context of
territorial sea," a ship engages in "an act of wilful and serious pollution." Id. This does not
preclude the Coastal State from taking action against an offending ship. See id. art. 220, at 488-89
and infra Part II.C.3.
98. Compare LOSC, supra note 9, art. 33, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409 with TSC, supra note 9, art
2, 15 U.S.T. at 1609, 516 U.N.T.S. at 208.
99. This statement does not reflect the debate at UNCLOS III over the continuing need for the
contiguous zone with the advent of the EEZ. See, e.g., UNCLOS III OR, supra note 82, 2nd Sess,
9th mtg., 2-32.
100. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 33, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409.
101. Compare id. art. 2, at 400 (using declaratory language that a state's sovereignty extends to
a territorial sea) with id. art. 33 at 409 (using permissive language that a state may exercise control
in a contiguous zone).
102. Id.
103. MOLENAAR, supra note 40, at 276.
104. Id.
105. See LOSC, supra note 9, art. 2, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 400.
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the LOSC. Again, as with the TSC, it most likely does not. As devel-
oped below, the coastal state is granted express jurisdiction over the pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment in the EEZ.!06 The
contiguous zone regime therefore appears irrelevant for coastal state
jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution."°7 The weight of state practice
seems to confirm this view.' 08
3. THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE & PROTECTION AND
PRESERVATION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
LOSC Part V, encompassing Articles 55-75, deals with the EEZ.' °9
LOSC Part XII, encompassing Articles 192-237, deals with the Protec-
tion and Preservation of the Marine Environment. 10 In dealing with
marine pollution in the EEZ, these two Parts of the LOSC must be
looked at together. The LOSC grants every coastal state the right to
establish an EEZ seaward of its territorial sea and extending out to a
maximum of 200 miles from its baseline."' Two "separate sets of
rights" exist in the EEZ: 1) those granted to the coastal state; and 2)
those enjoyed by all other nations. 2 The division is by activity, not by
zone or ship.1 13
Article 56(1) provides a summary of the coastal states rights and
jurisdiction within the EEZ." 4 In Article 56(1)(a), the coastal state is
granted sovereign rights over exploration, exploitation, conservation,
and management over living and non-living resources.' It thus vests
management and control of virtually all economically oriented activities
within the zone in the coastal state." 6 Article 56(1)(b) changes the ter-
minology regarding the action the coastal state may exercise: it grants
'Jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of [the LOSC
with regard to... the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment." 1 7 The "relevant provisions" phrase points one to Part XII of the
LOSC, "Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment."'" 8
In Part XII, Articles 193 and 194 expressly charge all states with a
106. Id. art. 56(1)(b), at 418.
107. MOLENAAR, supra note 40, at 281.
108. Id.
109. LOSC, supra note 9, arts. 55-75, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 418-28.
110. Id. arts. 192-237, at 477-96.
111. Id. art. 57.
112. Oxman, supra note 94, at 147, 153.
113. Id.
114. ATr'ARD, supra note 40, at 46.
115. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 56, at 418.
116. ArARD, supra note 40, at 46.
117. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
118. LOSC, supra note 9, Part XII, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 477-94.
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general duty to prevent and control marine pollution. 19 Articles 211
and 220 apply to coastal state action towards vessel source pollution.1 20
Article 211 delineates action states may take to reduce and control pollu-
tion from vessels. 21 It also reflects a balance between coastal and mari-
time state interests by allowing coastal states the discretion to enact
domestic laws and regulations to control vessel pollution through the
exercise of the coastal state's sovereignty within its territorial sea. Arti-
cle 211 also allows coastal states to adopt laws and regulations with
regard to its EEZ, but limits the maximum scope of those laws to those
"giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards
established through the competent international organization or general
diplomatic conference."122
Article 220 delineates the permitted enforcement measures. 123
Article 220(2) allows the coastal state to enforce its national laws
against a foreign ship causing a pollution incident in its territorial sea. 124
For discharges in the EEZ, Article 220, subsections (3), (5), and (6), sets
up a sliding scale that allows the coastal state to intervene to an increas-
ing degree in the offending ship's transit depending on how severe a
pollution discharge is. 125
For example, Article 220(3) allows the coastal state to require a
vessel to give information regarding its identity and port of registry, its
destination, and any other relevant information to establish whether a
violation has occurred. 26 Article 220(6) provides that a coastal state has
"the right to board, inspect, and when there is a threat of major damage,
arrest a merchant ship suspected of discharging pollutants in the zone in
violation of internationally approved standards."' 27 This right is subject
to substantial safeguards to protect shippers, outlined in Part XII, section
7.128 For instance, states may not delay a foreign vessel longer than
necessary for investigations; 29 even if an investigation of the ship indi-
cates a violation, it must be released promptly on a reasonable bond.' 31
Article 220 echoes the division seen in Article 211 regarding the
119. Id. arts. 193-94, at 478-79.
120. Id. arts. 211 & 220, at 483-85, 488-89.
121. Id. art. 211, at 483-85.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Oxman, supra note 94, at 154. The phrase "internationally approved standards" is a
reference to MARPOL 73/78, supra note 56. UN Impact Report, supra note 90, 28.
128. Oxman, supra note 94, at 154.
129. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 226, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 491.
130. Id. See also Oxman, supra note 94, at 154.
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scope of vessel-source pollution control laws that the coastal state may
enact. Coastal states, with respect to violations within their territorial
sea, may enforce either their national laws, or "violations of interna-
tional rules and standards for the prevention, reduction, and control of
pollution from vessels or laws and regulations of that state conforming
to and giving effect to such rules and standards.""13 On the other hand,
for discharges within the coastal state's EEZ, the state may only enforce
the international standards.
The phrase "competent international organization" is a reference to
the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter "IMO"), a United
Nations agency which deals with international shipping. 132 The phrases
"generally accepted international rules and standards" and "internation-
ally approved standards" refer to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the Protocol of 1978 Relating to
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973 (hereinafter "MARPOL 73/78"),113 or regional conventions drafted
under the authority of MARPOL 73/78.134 The original 1973 conven-
tion and the 1978 protocol are to be read together as a single instru-
ment. 135 MARPOL 73/78 superseded the 1954 Oil Pollution Prevention
Convention 136 for states that are parties to both, and requires that larger
ships not discharge oil, inter alia, fifty miles of land and that smaller
ships only discharge oil seaward of twelve miles from land. 37 Because
UNCLOS III was being negotiated at the signing of MARPOL 73/78,
Article 9(3) of MARPOL 73/78 gave an evolving meaning to the term
"jurisdiction." Article 9(3) states that jurisdiction "shall be construed in
the light of international law in force at the time of application or inter-
pretation of [MARPOL 73/78].' 13 ' This foresight allows MARPOL 73/
78 to be seamlessly integrated into the "umbrella" LOSC; note that
LOSC Article 56(1)(b) uses the term "jurisdiction" when referring to the
scope of authority the coastal state may exercise within its EEZ. 139
Article 58 provides a convenient summary of the rights of all other
131. Id. art. 220, at 488-89.
132. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 1 305,
U.N. Doc. No. A/52/487 (1997).
133. UN Impact Report, supra note 90, 28.
134. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 56.
135. Id. 1978 Protocol, art. 1.2.
136. See supra note 48.
137. This is an oversimplified characterization of MARPOL 73/78. MARPOL 73/78 contains
five detailed and technical annexes to regulate various forms of potential vessel pollutants: oil
(Annex I), noxious liquid substances in bulk (Annex 1I), harmful substances carried by sea in
packaged forms (Annex III), sewage (Annex IV), and garbage (Annex V).
138. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 56.
139. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 56, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 418.
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states within a coastal state's EEZ. 4 ° These rights include inter alia the
freedoms of the high seas of navigation and overflight, and to lay sub-
marine cables and pipelines. 4 ' It explicitly refers to Article 87, which
lists the freedoms exercised by all states on the high seas, but leaves
some of those freedoms out in regards to the freedoms states may exer-
cise in another state's EEZ. 142 The reference to Article 87 would seem
to indicate the drafters' intention to equate the quality of freedoms on
the high seas to the freedoms allowed in EEZs. 14 3
One of the difficult compromises at UNCLOS III was this accom-
modation between the rights of a coastal state within its EEZ with those
of other states on the high seas.144 This accommodation may be seen in
(1) the Article 220 sliding scale; (2) the limits on application of coastal
state enforcement of their domestic laws to its territorial sea, and
allowing only enforcement of domestic laws based on MARPOL 73/78
(or regional conventions drafted in accordance with MARPOL 73/78)
within its EEZ as provided in Articles 211 and 220; and (3) the safe-
guard provisions of Part XII, section 7.145
There was concern over the EEZ's effect on the traditional free-
doms enjoyed on the high seas, which threatened maritime states' inter-
ests; such states objected to any potential limit on their use of the high
seas.' 4 6 This arose out the disagreement over the juridical nature of the
EEZ.147 Was the EEZ an extension of the coastal state territorial sea,
part of the high seas in which the coastal state enjoyed enhanced rights
over resources and jurisdiction over maritime pollution tools and mari-
time research, or a sui generis zone, of new and unique legal rules? The
majority view was that it was a sui generis zone, having its own legal
regime, and thus breaking with the juridical structure developed at
UNCLOS I, which provided merely for states' territorial seas and the
140. Compare id. art. 58, at 419 (summarizing rights of other states within a coastal state's
EEZ) with id. art. 56, at 418 (summarizing a coastal state's rights within its own EEZ). See also
supra note 113, and accompanying text.
141. Id.
142. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 87, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 432-33.
143. ArrARD, supra note 40, at 63.
144. Id. at 71. For the freedoms as laid out in the HSC, supra note 39, see art. 2. The LOSC
lays out the freedoms at art. 87. The freedoms are open ended, and not exhaustive, and include:
freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law,
freedom of fishing, and freedom of scientific research. The last four freedoms are subject to other
provisions in the LOSC. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 87, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 432-43.
145. E.g., coastal states investigating a foreign ship for pollution infractions shall not delay the
vessel any longer than is essential for the investigation (art. 226); there are restrictions on
instituting proceedings against a vessel (art. 228); and a requirement to notify the flag state (art.
231). Id. arts. 226, 228, 231, at 491-93.
146. AIrARD, supra note 40, at 73.
147. Id.
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high seas. 14 1
D. The Exclusive Economic Zone and Customary International Law
Customary international law becomes established as international
law by a custom of general state practice that is followed out of a per-
ceived legal obligation (termed "opinio juris"). 149 Therefore, it is possi-
ble for states to follow a general practice, but not follow that practice as
a result of a perceived legal obligation, i.e., opinio juris is not yet pre-
sent. In this case, the practice would not have the status of customary
international law. However, once the practice is followed out of a per-
ceived legal obligation, it would attain the status of customary interna-
tional law.
Of course, the 1994 entry into force of the LOSC provides the obvi-
ous evidence that the concept of the EEZ has entered into international
law, at least among states who are parties. However, the status of the
EEZ in customary international law is important to determining the
applicability of the EEZ regime towards states that are not parties. 150
Even before the LOSC came into force, judicial decisions and commen-
tators, looking at state practice that resulted from UNCLOS III negotia-
tions, lent strong support to the idea that one of the basic concepts
behind the EEZ, that is, coastal state has sovereign rights over living
marine resources while foreign ships may exercise freedom of naviga-
tion, had entered into customary international law by the late 1980s. 151
For instance, in 1982, the International Court of Justice, and in 1984, a
Chamber of the Court, in fact declared that the EEZ concept had become
a part of customary international law. 15 2 Again, these decisions were
before the LOSC came into force. Now that it has entered into force, at
148. ATrARD, supra note 40, at 62.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
150. One article argues that signing of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part
XI of the LOSC and the subsequent wave of states becoming party to the LOSC, caused the whole
of the LOSC to "instantly" enter into customary international law. L. Carr & Gary L. Scott,
Multilateral Treaties and the Environment: A Case Study in the Formation of Customary
International Law, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 313 (1999). Three conditions must be met: (1)
a sufficient number of states in the international system must accept the treaty (2) a significant
number of states whose interests are substantially affected by the treaty are parties to the treaty,
(3) the treaty does not allow reservations. Id. at 314. Note that with regards to condition (2),
unanimity is not required, a mere "high degree of consensus" will do. Id. at 331.
151. ATTARD, supra note 40, at 308; Clingan, supra note 94, at 19, 20.
152. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, High Seas and Navigational Rights: What Are They and Who May
Assert Them in U.S. Courts, 20 PROC. L. SEA INST. 41, 41 (1986), citing the ICJ Case Concerning
the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment of 24.2.1982, par. 100, 1982
I.C.J.R. 74, and Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary on the Gulf of
Maine Are (Canada/United States of America), Judgment of 12.10.1984 given by the Chamber
Constituted by the Court, par. 94, 1984 I.C.J.R. 294.
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least the basic provisions of the EEZ, such as those provisions relating to
coastal state sovereign rights over living marine resources within its
EEZ, 153 and rights and freedoms of other states within a coastal state's
EEZ 1 54 have a fortiori entered into customary international law.
Some commentators, however, considered the "non-traditional"
rules (e.g., LOSC Article 56(2)) only "arguably reflective" of customary
international law as of the mid-1980s. 55 Provisions covering the more
ancillary jurisdictional aspects of the EEZ, such as marine science
research and environmental protection and preservation, may not have
yet "crystallized" into customary international law. 156 Now that the
LOSC has entered into force, one can examine the document itself to see
if any specific EEZ legal regime is given that may shed light on the
issue. Article 55 provides:
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this
Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state and
the rights and freedoms of other states are governed by the relevant
provisions of this Convention. 157
By its plain language, Part V, which contains the governing provi-
sions of the EEZ, establishes the legal regime by which the EEZ is to be
administered. Recall also that Part V references Part XII (entitled "Pro-
tection and Preservation of the Marine Environment"). Based on Article
55, it was the drafters' intention to codify the EEZ as a singular juridical
package, and to incorporate the applicable provisions of Part XII into
that legal regime. However, to understand fully which parts of the EEZ
regime have in fact become part of customary international law, one
must analyze state practice with regard to the EEZ. If a "sufficient"
number of states not party to the LOSC who have adopted an EEZ also
included pollution laws into their EEZ juridical regime that are consis-
tent with the LOSC's regime in Part V, and did so in a manner that
indicated that this practice was done out of a perceived legal obligation
(as evidenced through legislative language, official statements, etc.),
then there would be a strong argument that coastal state jurisdiction over
marine preservation and protection within an EEZ had entered into cus-
tomary international law. 158
153. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 56, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 418.
154. Id. art. 58, at 419.
155. ATrARD, supra note 40, at 306.
156. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 55, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 418.
157. ATrARD, supra note 40, at 306, 307.
158. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 149, pt. VI, 102 (stating without supporting
evidence that "[m]ost of the provisions of the [LOSC] concerning the protection of the marine
environment reflect customary international law"); but see W.T. Burke, Customary Law of the
Sea: Advocacy or Disinterested Scholarship?, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 508 (1989) (arguing that the
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An analysis along these lines is, however, outside the scope of this
Comment. To understand the United States' interpretation of the EEZ
under customary international law, it suffices to look at the United
States' practice towards the EEZ, and the legal basis for this practice.
This is discussed in section IV.A.
III. APPLICABLE DOMESTIC ACTS
A. Domestic Law: The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
FWPCA was originally enacted in 1948, and underwent a major
amendment by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (hereinafter "OPA '90"). 59
Congress meant for FWPCA to be a comprehensive approach to the
elimination of pollution from waters, including coastal waters. Congress
declared that the objective of the Act was to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."16
The FWPCA includes prohibitions on pollution discharges in the contig-
uous zone, and defines "contiguous zone" as the "entire zone established
or to be established by the United States under Article 24" of the
TSC. 16
1
The applicable enforcement provisions of the FWPCA are located
in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), which defines the criminal penalties under the
FWPCA. 162 It provides for fines of between $2,500 and $25,000 per
day or imprisonment of up to one year, or both, for negligent infractions
of the FWPCA, and for fines of between $5,000 and $50,000 or impris-
onment of up to three years for knowing violations of the FWPCA. 163
Violations of the FWCPA include discharging oil or hazardous sub-
stances upon the navigable waters of the United States 164 or its contigu-
RESTATEMENT'S declaration, without support, is a pretext to allow the United States to adhere to
most of the provisions of the LOSC while disregarding the deep seabed mining provisions of
LOSC, Part XI).
159. Oil Pollution Act, P.L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990). See generally Senate Rep. No.
House Conf. Rep. No. 101-653 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779.
160. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999).
161. §§ 1321(a)(9), 1362 (9).
162. § 1319(c).
163. It also provides for a fine of up to $250,000 and 15 years imprisonment for knowingly
placing a person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. "Organizational" persons
may be fined no more than $1,000,000. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (West 1986 & Supp. 1999).
164. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(3)(i) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999). The term "navigable waters" is
defined at 40 C.F.R. Part 110 (§ 110.1), which implements section 311 of the FWPCA, see 86
Stat. 862 (1972). The term includes the territorial seas, and generally all waters susceptible to use
in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide; interstate waters, intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), that are or
could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes. The territorial
seas is in turn defined by 33 U.S.C. § 1362 as a belt of water starting at the coast where the open
sea comes into contact with it and extending 3 miles seaward.
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ous zone; 165 discharging oil or hazardous substances in conjunction with
activities under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 166 or Deepwater
Port Act of 1974;167 and, if in such quantities as determined to be harm-
ful by the EPA, discharges that "may affect natural resources belonging
to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of the
U.S. 1 68 Liability for discharges in this situation is excepted if the dis-
charge is permissible under MARPOL 73/78.169
B. Domestic Law: Status of Law of the Sea Treaties
The United States signed, ratified, and deposited the instruments of
ratification for both the High Seas Convention and Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.' 7 ° Under the U.S. Constitution
they are the law of the land. 7
1
Despite the intensive, ten-year negotiation process at UNCLOS III,
the United States did not sign the LOSC due to concerns about the sea-
bed-mining regime.' 72 In July 1994, the United States and twenty-one
other states signed the "Agreement Relating to the Implementation of
Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982" ("the Agreement"). 73 This Agreement addressed the
concerns of the United States, and other nations about the LOSC seabed-
mining regime. Later that year, President Clinton sent the LOSC and the
Agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent on accession and
165. Note the term "navigable waters" includes "territorial seas", but does not include "waters
of the contiguous zone" or "the oceans." These terms are cited separately from "navigable
waters" later in 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(6).
166. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331.
167. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1501.
168. This includes resources under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (codified principally in 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq.) Some functions vested in
the President by the FWPCA as amended by OPA '90, were delegated to the EPA by Exec. Ord.
No. 12777, Oct. 18, 1997, 56 F.R. 54757, reprinted in Executive Orders, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321
(West 1986 & Supp. 1999).
169. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 56. Liability may also be excepted if a discharge is within
guidelines defined by the EPA through regulation. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(3)(ii)(B) (West 1986 &
Supp. 1999).
170. The United States signed the TSC, supra note 9, on April 29, 1958, ratified it March 24,
1961, and deposited the TSC ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on
April 12, 1961. It entered into force September 10, 1964. 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1606 (1964).
171. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
172. LOSC, supra note 9, Part XI, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 445-77.
173. There are difficulties with the implementation of the Agreement. The Agreement was to
enter into force when forty states consented to be bound by it. If the agreement did not enter into
force on the day the LOSC entered into force (Nov. 16, 1996), it applied provisionally.
Agreement art. 7. If certain conditions were not meant, the provisional application of the
Agreement terminates on Nov. 16, 1998. Agreement, art. 8. RENATE PLATZODER, THE 1994
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, BASIC DOCUMENTS WITH AN
INTRODuCION v (Renate Platz6der ed. 1994).
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ratification respectively. 174 However, since the Senate has yet to give its
advice and consent, the United States has not yet acceded to the LOSC.
This does not preclude the United States from being obligated
under portions of the LOSC which have become part of customary inter-
national law. This is discussed in Section IV.A.
C. Presidential Proclamations
In 1983, President Reagan issued Proclamation No. 5030 (hereinaf-
ter "Proc. 5030"), proclaiming the existence of the United States' Exclu-
sive Economic Zone. 17- In the prefatory clauses before proclaiming the
zone, President Reagan referenced the United States'
desire to facilitate the wise development and use of the oceans con-
sistent with international law ... [that international law recognized an
Exclusive Economic Zone where a coastal state] may assert certain
sovereign rights over natural resources and related jurisdiction ...
[and] the establishment of the U.S. EEZ will.., promote the protec-
tion of the marine environment, while not affecting the other lawful
uses of the zone ... by other states.176
The White House released a concurrent statement on the United
States' ocean policy which elaborated on the topic. 77 As discussed
above, although the LOSC was signed in 1982, with 155 states signing
the convention by the date it closed for signature, it did not enter into
force until sixty nations ratified it, in 1994. In Proc. 5030, President
Reagan asserted that the EEZ had in fact become established in custom-
ary international law based on UNCLOS III negotiations, even though
the LOSC had not yet entered into force. This was a controversial state-
ment. Other states objected to it because they believed the United
States, which in 1982 stated it would not sign the LOSC due to concerns
about the undersea mining provisions, was breaking up the singular
"package" that was the LOSC, in effect picking and choosing among the
provisions it liked and rejecting those it did not.' 78 Acceptance of the
"package deal" concept was established early in the negotiations, and
was considered the foundation upon which the entire LOSC was built. 17
174. See S.TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39 (1994).
175. Proc. 5030, supra note 5.
176. Id.
177. Statement by the President on United States Ocean Policy, PuB. PAPERS 378-79 (Mar. 10,
1983) [hereinafter Ocean Policy Statement].
178. The USSR objected to the U.S. unilateral establishment of its EEZ. U.N. Doc. A/38/175
(1983). The Group of 77 made similar objections. U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/5 (1983), as quoted in
Restatement Reporters' Note 8 of § 511.
179. This idea is open to argument. First, the "package deal" concept, despite its importance
and necessity being agreed upon early in the LOSC negotiations, did not preclude the rapid
development of the EEZ in customary international law: as of 1982 over fifty states declared an
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In 1988, President Reagan extended the United States' territorial
sea by issuing Proclamation No. 5829 (Proc. 5829).I 81 Proc. 5829
moved the territorial sea boundary for purposes of international law
only. 1 ' It did so by including an exception phrase: "[n]othing in this
proclamation (a) extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State
law or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interest, or obligations derived
therefrom .... "82 Thus, the definition of the territorial sea, as provided
in existing statutes, would remain unchanged until Congress specifically
changed the statutory definition.1 83
The most recent assertion of the United States' rights over the
oceans was President Clinton's Proc. 7219, discussed in Section I. An
exception phrase was also included in this proclamation, in that "nothing
in [Proc. 7219] alters or modifies domestic law." 184 Thus, any mention
of the contiguous zone in United States domestic law remains
unchanged until Congress or appropriate regulatory agencies specifically
redefine the breadth of the contiguous zone as it applies to a specific law
or regulation.
EEZ; by 1993 the number grew to 87. Riesenfeld, supra note 153, at 41; Introduction, THE LAW
OF THE SEA: NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE iii, U.N. Sales No.
E.93.V.10., Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, UN, NY (1993).
Second, at a 1986 forum one expert asserted that people who had interests in promoting the
"package deal" overextended by the concept, while other members of UNCLOS III took the view
that only certain things were tied together. Riesenfield, supra note 152, at 41.
Note, however, that early in the UNCLOS III the conference passed a resolution stating that
the "problems of ocean space are closely inter-related and need to be considered as a whole...".
UNCLOS III OR, 2nd Sess., 19th mtg, 2. Additionally, the package deal is widely cited as a
highly significant precedent of international negotiation.
The author does not mean to downplay the significance of the package deal, but point out that
there is disagreement on the significance of the concept.
180. Proc. 5829, supra note 5.
181. One of the resulting effects from this Proclamation was that the United States could now
move Soviet intelligence ships farther off the United States' coast. In fact, this was one of express
purposes.
182. Proc. 5829, supra note 5.
183. For an idea of the impact on domestic law, see supra note 7.
184. Interestingly, the language is different than that used in Proc. 5928. Compare the phrase
used in Proc. 5928: "Nothing in this proclamation: (a) extends or otherwise alters existing Federal
or State law or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom; or (b)
impairs the determination, in accordance with international law, of any maritime boundary of the
United States with a foreign jurisdiction," Proc. 5928, supra note 5, with that used in Proc. 7219:
Nothing in this proclamation:
(a) amends existing Federal or State law;
(b) amends or otherwise alters the rights and duties of the United States or other
nations in the [EEZ] of the United States established by Proclamation 5030...; or
(c) impairs the determination, in accordance with international law, or any maritime
boundary of the United States with a foreign jurisdiction.
Proc. 7219, supra note 2. Whether there is any substantive reason for the different wording has
not been made public. The author acknowledges and thanks Professor B.H. Oxman for pointing
this out.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The United States' Customary International Law Interpretation of
the Exclusive Economic Zone
In Proc. 5030, establishing the EEZ, President Reagan expressed
the United States' recognition of customary international law regarding
coastal states' jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations and struc-
tures having economic purposes, and jurisdiction to protect and preserve
the marine environment. 8 5 In his Statement on United States Ocean
Policy, released concurrently with Proc. 5030, President Reagan elabo-
rated upon this, stating that the United States, in effect, accepted the
EEZ as conceived in the LOSC, with one exception: the United States
would not assert any jurisdiction over marine scientific research within
its EEZ, but would respect the right of other coastal states to do so, as
the LOSC provides. He admitted that the EEZ,
"[e]nable[s] the U.S. to take limited additional steps to protect the
marine environment." In this connection, the United States will con-
tinue to work through the International Maritime Organization and
other appropriate international organizations to develop uniform
international measures for the protection of the marine environment
while imposing no unreasonable burdens on international
shipping."' 86
One additional issue regarding the scope of the United States'
adherence to the LOSC's EEZ regime is the United States' practice
regarding limits that international law places on coastal state criminal
enforcement jurisdiction pertaining to pollution regulation in the EEZ.
The FWPCA allows for criminal liability in the EEZ, if a negligent or
knowing pollution discharge occurs in connection with activities under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act or Deepwater Port Act of 1974,
or if pollution negligently or knowingly discharged affects resources
managed under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Manage-
ment Act.' 87 Activities under all these statutes could occur anywhere
with in the 188-mile breadth of the U.S. EEZ. 88 Thus Congress, by
passing this legislation, is assuming prescriptive jurisdiction out to the
200-mile seaward limit of the EEZ.
185. Proc. 5030, supra note 5.
186. Ocean Policy Statement, supra note 177. (emphasis added).
187. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(3) (West Supp. 2000).
188. The EEZ starts seaward of the coastal State's territorial sea. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 57,
1833 U.N.T.S. at 419. Assuming, for international purposes, a twelve-mile U.S. territorial sea,
and applying a maximum 200-mile EEZ as measured from the same baseline as the territorial sea,
the U.S. EEZ comes to 188 miles.
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However, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(m), an administrative provision for
vessels, provides that:
(1) Anyone authorized by the President to enforce the provisions of
this section with respect to any vessel may, except as to public
vessels-
(A) board and inspect any vessel upon the navigable waters of
the U.S. or the waters of the contiguous zone
(B) with or without a warrant, arrest any person who in the pres-
ence or view of the authorized person violates the provisions of
this section or any regulation issued thereunder.'
89
In § 1321(m)(1)(A), Congress has enacted more limited enforce-
ment jurisdiction to take action enforcing the criminal provisions of the
FWPCA, authorizing the United States Coast Guard, the agency charged
with enforcement, to board and inspect only vessels inshore of the con-
tiguous zone's twelve-mile outer limit. 9 ' On the other hand,
§ 1321(m)(1)(B), seems to allow the United States Coast Guard to arrest
anyone violating the FWPCA anywhere a discharge occurs, out to the
200-mile limit of the EEZ. 91 These sections can however be read to be
consistent with international law and internal practices of the United
States Coast Guard. Interpreted this way, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(m)(1)(B)
merely provides the Coast Guard with enforcement jurisdiction against a
foreign vessel seaward of the contiguous zone, after obtaining flag state
permission to take action against a ship flying a foreign flag. This
assumes that the Coast Guard follows its normal internal practice. 192 In
this latter interpretation, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(m)(1)(B) merely gives the
Coast Guard legal competence to act under United States domestic law,
by giving enforcement jurisdiction to enforce United States domestic
law when and if the flag state grants the United States permission to take
action against one of the flag state's vessels found violating the FWPCA
in the United States' EEZ.
In fact, under United States law, this is the only way this statute can
be read. Where two interpretations are possible, as Chief Justice Mar-
189. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(m) (West Supp. 2000).
190. Exec. Order No. 12,777, reprinted in Note 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (West 1986 & Supp.
2000). Recall that until statutes are changed to reflect the extension of the contiguous zone, it
remains defined by TSC, art. 24, at twelve miles from the base line. TSC, supra note 9, 15 U.S.T.
at 1612-13, 516 U.N.T.S. at 220-22.
191. Recall, for example, that it is prohibited to discharge oil or hazardous substances which
may affect natural resources under the exclusive management authority of the United States,
which includes fish under the management of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Management and
Conservation Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3).
192. See Rachel Canty, Limits of Coast Guard Authority to Board Foreign Flag Vessels on the
High Seas, 23 TUL. MAR. L.J. 123, 137 (1998).
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shall wrote in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 193 "an act of Con-
gress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains."' 94 Thus, it can be said that the
United States has taken legislative action that recognizes the principal
that international law does not allow a coastal state to enforce its unilat-
erally enacted domestic laws seaward of twelve-miles from its baseline,
which happens to be the seaward limit of states' territorial seas as
defined by the LOSC, and the current seaward limit of the United States'
contiguous zone for purposes of the FWPCA.
The impact of this legislative interpretation can be reconciled with
statements by the United States delegation to UNCLOS III. In the
United States' general statement made at the beginning of the Caracas
session of UNCLOS III, delegation head Ambassador Stevenson, while
noting "with satisfaction the growing consensus on the limits of national
and international jurisdiction,"' 9 expressed support for an international
regime for pollution control within a 200-mile economic zone. Elabo-
rating on the United States' position regarding the to-be-developed EEZ,
he said:
[c]oastal States would have a duty not only to prevent unjustifiable
interferences with navigation, overflight and other non-resource uses,
but also to respect international environmental obligations with
respect to the zone as a whole ... it was clear that many delegations,
including [the United States] although prepared to accept condition-
ally a 200-mile economic zone, would not accept the requirement of
... plenary coastal state control over vessel-source pollution within
the zone. 196
In this regard, the LOSC must have alleviated Ambassador Steven-
son's concerns, for LOSC Article 211(5) is clear:
Coastal States, for the purpose of enforcement as provided for in sec-
tion 6, may in respect of their exclusive economic zones adopt laws
and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
from vessels conforming to and giving effect to generally accepted
international rules and standards established through the competent
international organization or general diplomatic conference. 197
Recalling that "generally accepted international rules and stan-
dards" is a reference to MARPOL 73/78,198 coastal states may, per Arti-
cle 211(5), only enact laws within their EEZ that give effect to
193. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 64 (1804).
194. Id. at 118.
195. UNCLOS III OR, supra note 82, 2nd Sess., 38th mtg., 26.
196. Id. 32, 34.
197. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 211(5), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 483-85.
198. Supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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MARPOL 73/78, to the exclusion of "plenary coastal state control over
vessel-source pollution" within the EEZ. 199
The United States has thus accepted the concept of the EEZ, as
evidenced by congressional legislation giving substance to the EEZ.2°
Additional evidence is found in President Reagan's 1983 Ocean Policy
Statement in which the United States commits to work with the IMO to
develop uniform international standards to protect the marine environ-
ment, per LOSC Article 211.21 These examples provide evidence that
the United States acts as if the EEZ has become customary international
law. The United States thus aspires to act in accordance with the EEZ,
as set by the entirety of the legal regime set in Part V of the LOSC,
which, for the first time, conceptualized the very existence of an EEZ.
This regime includes the requirements of a coastal state to recognize
other states' rights in its EEZ, including the freedoms of navigation and
overflight, and the laying of submarine cables.2 °2 Based on these rea-
199. The issue then arises about what states may do bilaterally, as has been past United States'
practice to get flag State permission to take action against offending foreign vessels based on a
variety of unilateral national laws. For example, laws concerning immigration or drugs. See
Canty, supra note 192. Where the United States is not yet a party to the LOSC, the question
would be whether this sort of ad hoc bilateral agreement had entered into customary international
law. It most likely has not. However, assuming that one day the United States will accede to the
LOSC, this question will need to be addressed.
This provision may be contrary to the LOSC if the United States accedes to the LOSC.
Assuming that 33 U.S.C. § 1321(m)(l)(B) would only come into play provided that the United
States got prior flag State authorization to take action against an offending vessel, is this action
permitted under the LOSC? LOSC Article 311(3) provides guidance:
Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the
operation of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to the relations
between them, provided that such agreements do not relate to a provision derogation
from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of
this Convention, and provided further that such agreements shall not affect the
application of the basic principles embodied herein, and that the provisions of such
agreements do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the
performance of their obligations under this Convention.
LOSC, supra note 9, art. 311(3), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 519. The question to be answered, if the
United States was a party to the LOSC: Is this sort of ad hoc bilateral agreement between a flag
state and the United States, where the United States is seeking flag state authorization to enforce
the FWPCA (a unilaterally enacted domestic law) against a flag state's vessel, constitute "deroga-
tion from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of this
Convention?" On one hand, it is unilateral coastal state action, precisely what the LOSC sought to
preclude. On the other hand, the flag state could deny the U.S. request. Also, this ad hoc bilateral
agreement could not effect the rights or performance of obligations of other states-parties. A
mutually convenient solution would be for the United States to agree to suspend any resulting
proceedings, provided the flag State commence similar proceedings under its laws. See LOSC
supra note 10, Part XII, section 7, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 490-93.
200. See, e.g., Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1801 et seq.
201. Ocean Policy Statement, supra note 177.
202. See, e.g. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 58, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 419, which also includes the
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sons, the United States, in addition to being bound by the TSC and HSC,
has obligated itself as a result of its interpretation that the entire EEZ
regime of the LOSC has entered into customary international law.
B. Nexus Between the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Contiguous
Zone to Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention
The concept of "preservation and protection of the marine environ-
ment" and its possible application to the contiguous zone must be evalu-
ated in the larger context of the entire LOSC and development of the
international law of the sea. Article 31 (hereinafter "General Rule of
Interpretation") of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (here-
inafter "Vienna Convention") provides that, "[a] treaty shall be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.'z0 3 Therefore, if the wording is not plain, the context of how
pollution is addressed within the LOSC may be discerned by examining
of the LOSC's structure or individual articles. Any patterns, per Article
31 of the Vienna Convention, have interpretive force on how the LOSC
was meant to apply pollution measures.
First, the LOSC has dedicated all of Part XII, "Protection and Pres-
ervation of the Marine Environment," to the concept of pollution. The
terms "territorial sea" and "exclusive economic zone" are mentioned
throughout LOSC Part XII where applications of state jurisdiction or
control in various zones are discussed. 2" Additionally, in Part V, (cov-
ering the EEZ), the LOSC grants the coastal state jurisdiction expressly
within its EEZ to protect and preserve the marine environment by cross-
referencing to Part XII. Meanwhile, the term "contiguous zone" is not
mentioned at all throughout the forty-five articles that make up Part XII.
Nor is any reference made establishing a nexus between the contiguous
zone and Part XII.
Construction of individual LOSC articles is consistent with a dis-
tinction between marine pollution control and the four categories of laws
(fiscal, immigration, customs and sanitation) that expressly provide a
recognition of all states to enjoy internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to the freedoms
delineated in the text, including "those associated with the operations of ships, aircraft and
submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with other provisions of [the LOSCI." Id.
203. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27,
entered into force Jan. 27, 1990. (emphasis added) Although the United States is not a party, the
ALl has asserted that the treaty codifies international law. RESTATEMENT [THIRD], supra note
149, Pt. I Ch. 1 Intro. Note; id. at § 102 cmt. f.
204. See, e.g., LOSC, supra note 9, art. 210, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 483-89. Pollution by Dumping;
art. 211, Pollution by vessels; art. 216, Enforcement with Respect to Pollution by Dumping; art.
218, Enforcement by Port States; art. 220, Enforcement by Coastal States.
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basis for coastal state control within its contiguous zone. For example,
LOSC Article 19, "Meaning of Innocent Passage," differentiates
between the concepts of 1) violating a coastal state's sanitary laws and
2) doing an act of "wilful and serious pollution" as two of the twelve
specific acts that violate the concept of innocent passage within a coastal
state's territorial sea.2°5
Likewise, Article 21, Laws and Regulations of the Coastal State
relating to innocent passage, makes a similar distinction, separately cate-
gorizing on one hand "customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws, 2 °6
and, on the other hand, laws to control pollution in the territorial sea, as
separate classes of laws or regulations that a coastal state may enact
relating to foreign ship's innocent passage through the coastal state's
territorial sea.207 It would hardly make sense for sanitary to mean pollu-
tion, where, in reference to these two articles, which both relate to the
relationship between innocent passage and coastal state control, the
terms are listed under separate and distinct labels.
LOSC Article 220(3) provides that
Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navi-
gating in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of a state
has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed a violation of appli-
cable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution from vessels or laws and regulations of that
state conforming and giving effect to such rules and standards, that
state may require the vessel to give information regarding its identity
and port of registry, its last and its next port of call and other relevant
information required to establish whether a violation has occurred.20 8
Articles 220(5) and (6) refer back to Article 220(3), and provide a
greater range of responses a coastal state may take, depending if the
violation is a discharge causing (or threatening) significant damage to
the marine environment or major damage to the coastline or related
interests.20 9 The plain language of Article 220 indicates that, seaward of
the territorial sea, coastal state enforcement action may only be taken
where there are clear grounds (or, in the case of Article 220(6), "clear
objective evidence") for believing an infraction occurred in the EEZ.21
No mention is made, however, of coastal state allowance to make laws
similar to Article 220(3), (5), and (6) applicable to a contiguous zone.
205. Id. art. 19, at 404-05.
206. Id. art. 21, at 405-06.
207. Id.
208. Id. art. 220(3), at 489.
209. Id. arts. 220(5) & (6), at 489.
210. LOSC Article 211(6) provides procedures coastal States may take to enact more stringent
pollution control due to special circumstances within their EEZ. Id. art. 211, at 484-85.
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Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a coastal state that has only
declared a contiguous zone, and not an EEZ, most likely may not, by a
plain reading of Article 220, assert the "sanitary" term as a basis for
action because an infraction occurred in its contiguous zone within the
provisions of that article. The contiguous zone is not provided as a zone
in which pollution laws may be enforced in Article 220(3), (5), or (6),
because Article 220 mentions both "territorial sea" and "exclusive eco-
nomic zone" to the exclusion of "contiguous zone."
The LOSC contains important modifications to the contiguous
zone. 2  The most obvious change is the expansion in breadth from
twelve miles in the TSC to twenty-four miles in the LOSC.21 2 Next, the
juridical nature of the contiguous zone is seemingly changed.21 3 In the
TSC, the contiguous zone is expressly designated as part of the high
seas.214 The LOSC does not provide whether the contiguous zone is part
of the high seas or part of the EEZ. It merely states, "[iln a zone contig-
uous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone .... ,2 15 Also
in the LOSC, unlike the EEZ, the contiguous zone does not make refer-
ence to any specific legal regime.21 6
These seem to indicate the drafters' desire to separate the EEZ and
contiguous zone. One can readily see the importance of keeping the
zones autonomous, particularly where the LOSC balances the creeping
jurisdiction of the coastal state against the traditional freedoms of the
high seas. Recall that states must declare the existence of each zone.217
So a state may have only a contiguous zone, or only an EEZ, or may
have both. If the two zones are declared by a state, a question arises as
to whether the EEZ subsumes the contiguous zone. If the two zones
merged, then the next step on the slippery slope would be for the con-
cepts of control that the coastal state could exercise in the contiguous
zone would be extended for the 200-mile breadth of the EEZ and would
be diluted, because the EEZ was conceived as an economic zone for
which the coastal state exercised sovereign rights and jurisdiction over
specifically granted rights out of the "bundle" of rights available un-
der the LOSC. "Indeed, one reason why some states wanted to retain
the contiguous zone was to emphasize the economic function of the
211. Ar-rARD, supra note 40, at 128.
212. TSC, supra note 9, art. 24 15 U.S.T. at 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. at 220-22; LOSC, supra note
9, art. 33, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409.
213. ATTARD, supra note 40, at 128.
214. TSC, supra note 9, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. at 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. at 220-22.
215. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 33(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409.
216. ArrARD, supra note 40, at 128. LOSC, supra note 9, art. 55, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 418,
provides that the EEZ is subject to the specific legal regime provided for in Part V.
217. The language of the TSC seems to assume that all states have a territorial sea. See
BROWNLIE, supra note 41, at 183-84.
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EEZ."E18
This overview of the applicable provisions of the LOSC's use of
the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone in the context of laws
and regulations over the preservation and protection of the marine envi-
ronment seems to rule heavily against the assertion of a contiguous zone
legal regime as a basis for state action against a pollution offender. Add
to this assertion the historical probability that learned societies and con-
ferences from the 1920s to the 1960s also did not mean for a contiguous
zone to be a regime in which marine pollution is regulated by the coastal
state, and this assertion is strengthened even more.
The development of the international law of the sea as reflected in
the LOSC addresses a need for pollution control that was lacking in the
UNCLOS I Geneva treaties. While pollution concerns were increasing
worldwide in the late 1960s-70s, there was an argument to stretch the
meaning of sanitary in the context of the Geneva treaties.2' 9 This could
be why the United States stretched the meaning of sanitary to include
pollution; to fill a void. But where this need is addressed by direct lan-
guage by a forum of such widespread participation and support such as
UNCLOS III, in a manner entirely consistent with the United States del-
egation's statements made early in UNCLOS III, and as accepted by the
United States as evidenced by President Reagan's statement upon estab-
lishment of the EEZ, certainly the support for the interpretation that san-
itary means pollution is gone.
An additional side note is that where the UNCLOS III negotiators
wanted to stretch the contiguous zone, they did so in a direct manner.
Specifically, later in UNCLOS III, concerns were voiced over underwa-
ter cultural heritage. LOSC Article 303 was added to expand the mean-
ing of LOSC Article 33 (covering the contiguous zone). Article 303
expresses the presumption that removal of UCH from the contiguous
zone would be an infraction of the coastal state's laws applicable in the
territorial sea and therefore within the scope of Article 33. One may
again ask why, if the negotiators at UNCLOS III did this for underwater
cultural heritage, did they not do it for pollution? The answer is:
because they did not have to; it was already addressed in a manner con-
sistent with the international consensus.
218. ATTARD, supra note 40, at 128.
219. This concern was reflected in the statements made by the LOSC negotiators at the
beginning of the Caracas session in July-August 1974. The UNCLOS III OR, supra note 82,
indicate over thirty States mentioned the need for UNCLOS IH to consider pollution: e.g. Egypt
(2nd Sess., 23rd mtg. T 67, 73), United Kingdom (2nd Sess., 29th mtg. 37-38), Lebanon (2nd
Sess., 33rd mtg. T 25), Nigeria (2nd Sess., 34th mtg. 8), and Japan (2nd Sess., 41st mtg. T 53).
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C. The United States' Interpretation of Pollution Control in the
Contiguous Zone
An interpretation equating "sanitary" with "pollution", however, is
exactly what the United States used as a basis upon which it first regu-
lated oil pollution within the contiguous zone under the TSC. As stated
in a memorandum from the United States Department of State Office of
the Legal Advisor:
The authority under which the United States may regulate, with
regard to pollution by oil, the conduct of foreign vessels beyond the
territorial sea and impose sanctions for violation of such regulations
is confined in article 24 of the [TSC]. Article 24(1)(a) allows the
coastal state [in its contiguous zone] to exercise the control necessary
to "prevent infringement of its ... sanitary regulations within its ter-
ritory or territorial seas.22 °
A short time later, Congress exercised its perceived legislative
jurisdiction. In 1970 it passed the Water Quality Improvement Act
(hereinafter "WQIA"). The WQIA amended the FWPCA, and extended
the prohibition on oil discharges inside the three-mile territorial sea out
to the twelve-mile limit of the contiguous zone, unless the discharge was
permitted under the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil, as amended in 1962.221
As pointed out above, there is no overt connection between the con-
tiguous zone and pollution in the LOSC. This specific nexus between
the EEZ and pollution control, to the exclusion of any nexus between the
contiguous zone and pollution control, has to weigh decisively since the
contiguous zone is not mentioned once in the LOSC Part V (covering
the EEZ) or Part XII (covering the Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment). It is thus safe to assert that it is highly unlikely
that the contiguous zone had anything to do with pollution in the context
of international law as stated in the LOSC.
So why the assertion by the Secretary of State Office of Legal
Advisor that the United States could rely on the term sanitary to assert
jurisdiction over pollution regulations in the contiguous zone? Again,
evidence points to the answer being "to fill a void." The historical con-
text provides insight. In considering these possible explanations, it
220. Memorandum from Louis P. Georgantas, Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of
State, to Honorable George H. Fallon, Chairman, Public Works Committee, House of
Representatives (Mar. 24, 1969), as quoted in WULF, supra note 71, at 36-37. The definition of
the contiguous zone in the LOSC, supra note 9, art. 33, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 409, echoes the
definition of the contiguous zone in the TSC, supra note 9, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. at 1612, 516
U.N.T.S. at 220-22.
221. P.L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970).
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becomes apparent, and will be addressed in Part V, that it is time to
amend the FWPCA.
Interestingly, other instruments used the contiguous zone in a way
not intended by the negotiators of the TSC. This may be because these
instruments' drafters saw the contiguous zone as a mutually convenient
recognized distance for their desired end, or, under international law, a
convenient surrogate for an assumed-soon-to-become twelve-mile terri-
torial sea. For example, in 1966, the United States extended its exclu-
sive fisheries zone seaward from its three-mile territorial sea out to a
twelve-mile limit, but did not base this move on the applicable
UNCLOS I Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas. 22 The Treaty on the Prohibition of
Emplacement of Nuclear Arms and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (more com-
monly known as the "Seabed Arms Control Treaty") used the contigu-
222. P.L. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (1966). Article 7 of the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, supra note 39, permits coastal states to
take unilateral conservation measures in zones contiguous to coastal States' territorial seas. This
unilateral action is conditioned on (1) the coastal State attempting to negotiate with other
concerned States, and those negotiations had not led to an agreement within six months, (2) there
is a need for "urgent application of conservation measures in light of the existing knowledge of
the fishery," (3) the measures are based on scientific findings, (4) the measures do not
discriminate against any foreign fishermen. Id. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that
the United States initiated any negotiations in this regard. See 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3282-91 (1966).
Additionally, nothing indicates an urgent need for the legislation. Id. at 3284. Also, the
legislative history appears to specifically intend to prejudice Soviet fishermen, who in reality were
using fishery activities as subterfuge for "snooping purposes." Id. at 3284, 3291. The legislative
history indicates the need for the legislation is based on general conservation requirements: "over
the past few years, but more particularly the past several months, there has been a tremendous
increase in the taking of fishery resources by foreign vessels within 12 miles of U.S. shores." Id.
at 3284. However, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Stanley A. Cain wrote, with regards to the
proposed legislation: "[i]t should be pointed out that the extension of the fisheries jurisdiction of
the United States would in most cases be of relatively little value in solving conservation
problems. Id. at 3292. The legislative history seems to devote as much print to the status of U.N.
member nations' trend toward establishing twelve mile exclusive fisheries zones for their
nationals: "[s]ince the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference [UNCLOS II] there has been a trend
toward the establishment of a 12-mile fisheries rule in international practice." Letter from Asst.
Secretary for Congressional Relations, for the Secretary of State, to the Chairman, House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, reprinted at id. 3294-95. See also id. at 3286-3289
(including mention that more than sixty out of ninety-nine coastal nations in the U.N. membership
as of 1966 "have a 12-mile fishery zone, either as territorial sea-some are 12-mile territorial sea
countries-or as territorial seas of less than 12-miles, plus a contiguous zone which will make a
total of 12 miles exclusive fishery jurisdiction.") Note that contiguous zone in this context refers
merely to a zone next to, or contiguous to, the territorial sea, and not contiguous zone as defined in
TSC, supra note 9, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. at 1612-13, 516 U.N.T.S. at 220-22. These legislative
history provisions are evidence that the United States did not base the expansion of exclusive
fisheries zone on the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High
Seas.
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ous zone, by name, for a limit.2 23 In fact, it specifically defined the
contiguous zone by referencing Article 24 ("Contiguous Zone") of the
TSC. By the end of 1974, fifty-four parties ratified or acceded to this
treaty.224
Use of the twelve-mile breadth in these additional contexts, when
considered with the United States' "interpreting" the word sanitary to
include pollution, all of which were beyond the scope of fiscal, immigra-
tion, sanitation and customs laws, at least suggests that the future uses of
the twelve-mile limit would become less objectionable as time went on.
At most, they signify greater ammunition for establishing a uniform a
twelve-mile maximum limit on a sovereign territorial sea.
The twelve-mile maximum territorial sea limit was recognized
early in the UNCLOS III negotiations. In the general statements made
by nations at the beginning of the substantive discussions held at the
1974 Caracas Session of UNCLOS III, the Soviet Union noted, "the 12-
mile limit for the territorial sea was recognized by approximately 100
states and was in keeping with the overwhelming majority of coastal
states." '225 Additionally, seventy nations, including the United States,
specifically noted either their support for a twelve-mile maximum terri-
torial sea limit or that they had already established one at that breadth. 26
The United States' interpretation of "sanitary" to include pollution
in the context of the contiguous zone as provided in the TSC does not
indicate an insistence that the contiguous zone be a zone for coastal
states' right to assert unilateral pollution control laws. It, instead,
merely indicates the United States' acceptance of the twelve-mile terri-
torial sea. Indeed, this is the only meaning consistent with the develop-
ment of the international law of the sea, when one considers 1) the
United States interpreted the contiguous zone provision of the TSC in a
context outside of its apparent intended meaning when adopted, but
within the clear international trend of adopting a twelve-mile territorial
sea, and 2) the United States' statement at UNCLOS III and those made
by President Reagan in 1983 on the EEZ. 27
223. 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115, opened for signature Feb. 11, 1971.
224. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8798, TREATIES IN
FORCE 409 (1975).
225. UNLOS III OR, supra note 82, 2nd Sess., 22nd mtg., 35.
226. The United States statement can be found at id., 38th mtg., 25-39.
227. One last argument for the proposition that the United States acknowledges an obligation
to not unilaterally create enforcement jurisdiction beyond twelve miles from their shores is
discussed supra, the limit Congress placed on the United States' enforcement jurisdiction found at
33 U.S.C. § 1321(m).
[Vol. 55:487
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION 7219
D. Pollution Discharges Between Twelve and Twenty-Four Miles
from the Baseline
This belt of coastal ocean is the area absorbed into the contiguous
zone by Proc. 7219. As discussed, the EEZ and contiguous zone are
most likely sui generis zones with separate legal regimes. Thus, where
the United States has declared the existence of both zones, both legal
regimes apply within this belt.
Under international law, sanitary most likely does not encompass
pollution. Therefore the rights granted to the coastal state to exercise the
control necessary to punish/prevent violations of fiscal, immigration,
sanitation and customs laws and regulations may not be used as a basis
of coastal state jurisdiction against foreign vessel source pollution. Also
discussed supra, there is no need for the United States to continue with
its interpreting sanitary to include pollution. But, even if the United
States continued with this unique interpretation, the FWPCA still refer-
ences the TSC (which is still in force for the United States) definition of
the contiguous zone, i.e., a zone that extends only twelve miles from the
baseline. Recall also the exclusion clause in Proc. 7219, in that "nothing
in [Proc. 7219] alters or modifies domestic law." For the FWPCA to
apply in this belt of ocean, the FWPCA would therefore have to be
amended to expressly refer to a twenty-four-mile contiguous zone.
Therefore, as it stands now, Proc. 7219 has no effect on this zone of
ocean under the FWPCA.
An argument may be made that the FWPCA should be amended to
allow increased enforcement jurisdiction out to the seaward 200-mile
limit of the EEZ, to gain the full power of potential pollution authority
gained from the declaration of the EEZ by the Proc. 5030. Recall, that
either all of the EEZ regime, or only the more general provisions as
provided for in LOSC Articles 56 and 58, have entered into customary
international law. Either way, Part XII would apply, because Part V is
cross-referenced into Part XII by Article 56. More on point, however, is
that the United States, through Proc. 5030 establishing the EEZ, and the
related Statement on Ocean Policy, has declared its adherence to the
entire EEZ regime as set in the LOSC. 2 8
Under LOSC Article 220(3) (included in LOSC Part XII), coastal
states may enact national laws with respect towards pollution control
within their territorial sea, provided that they not hamper innocent pas-
sage. However, the coastal state's legislative jurisdiction against pollu-
tion discharges within its EEZ as provided by the LOSC is limited by
Articles 211(5), 220(5) and 220(6) to the application of "international
228. Proc. No. 5030, supra note 5. Ocean Policy Statement, supra note 176.
2001]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
rules and standards," and this phrase is a reference to MARPOL 73/78.
Therefore, the United States should not amend the FWPCA to proscribe
in blanket fashion pollution over the entire EEZ. This would be contrary
to the LOSC as unilateral coastal state legislation that oversteps the
attempt at uniformity around the world's oceans, and contrary to prior
declarations by the United States. While the tools available to the
coastal state may be more limited than environmentalists would prefer,
the uniformity provided by the umbrella LOSC and more detailed imple-
menting conventions, such as MARPOL 73/78, provide at least an
increasing incremental approach to world recognition of the importance
of the protection of the marine environment, where one did not exist
before the LOSC.
MARPOL 73/78 calls for states-parties to enact laws proscribing
violation of that convention. This is not done within the FWPCA, how-
ever. It has been done at 33 U.S.C. § 1901-MARPOL 73/78 requires
that larger ships not discharge oil within fifty miles of land, while
smaller ships can only discharge seaward of twelve miles from land. So,
it again may be asserted, that Proc. 7219 does nothing for enhancement
of pollution control under the FWPCA within the ocean belt between
twelve- and twenty-four miles from the United States baseline.
Once some provisions of the FWPCA are used against a polluter,
the action could very well be contrary to international law. But merely
passing a law does not make it contrary to international law; it actually
has to be enforced to breach international law. If the United States pros-
ecuted an offending ship outside the provisions of MARPOL 73/78 (i.e.,
33 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), for pollution discharge beyond its territorial
sea but within its EEZ, and that ship's flag state was 1) a party to
MARPOL 73/78, and 2) there was no ad hoc bilateral agreement
between the flag state and United States, that flag state would have
grounds to protest the action as contrary to international law.229
V. CONCLUSION
Proclamation No. 7219 does nothing to increase the ability of
United States to deal with pollution in its contiguous zone. It is thus not
clear what the Vice President meant when he hailed the contiguous zone
extension as a counter to "would-be polluters. '230 This assertion regard-
229. Since parties to MARPOL 73/78 administer over 93% of the world's gross registered
shipping tonnage, it would be a good probability that the flag state was a party to MARPOL 73/
78. Maria Valenzuela, Enforcing Rules Against Vessel-Source Degradation of the Marine
Environment: Coastal, Flag, and Port State Jurisdiction, in ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY 188 (Davor Vidas & Willy Ostreng eds., 1999).
230. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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ing Proc. 7219 is true, unless the unique interpretation by the United
States in 1970 of sanitary as meaning pollution carries any weight in
international law. Since this interpretation is not supported by historical
development, subsequent official United States' statements, or the cur-
rent international law of the sea, as provided under the Law of the Sea
Convention, it simply could not. Additionally, this assertion is strength-
ened where this interpretation is no longer needed given the current legal
regime of the international law of the sea.
The LOSC contains express provisions on a pollution regime,
agreed to in an international convention of unprecedented participation
and duration, which yielded a strongly supported multilateral treaty.
When the international law of the sea was governed by the 1958 Geneva
treaties, which hardly mentioned pollution, along with the 1954 Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, it may have been
permissible to stretch an interpretation of sanitary to bring order to an
area that needed it. In fact, the concept may have gained momentum
and become an established part of international law. However, that need
has been addressed directly by the LOSC.
The FWPCA provides for criminal fines and jail time for offenses
seaward of twelve miles from the United States' coasts. Jail is contrary
to the LOSC Article 230 (except in a case of willful and serious act of
pollution in the territorial sea). Where the United States accedes to the
general EEZ regime, and the regime incorporates a pollution control
scheme, which includes Article 230, if the FWPCA was unilaterally
enforced by the United States in its EEZ and its most stringent punish-
ments of jail imposed, the flag state of the offending ship would have a
strong claim that the action was contrary to customary international law.
The proper recourse by the United States would be enforcement under
33 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., which codifies MARPOL 73/78, the "interna-
tional rules and standards" referred to throughout the LOSC Part XII.
Should the offending ship's flag state not be a party to MARPOL 73/78,
the United States should seek flag state authorization to take action; to
do otherwise may be contrary to the overall scheme of the EEZ and
coastal state pollution control as under customary international law.
To account for the current state of the international law of the sea,
the FWPCA should be amended to define the United States' territorial
sea as twelve miles from the coast, to appreciate the full force of coastal
state sovereignty over its territorial sea. It should also be amended to
provide for legislative and enforcement jurisdiction out to the seaward
limit of the twelve-mile territorial sea. For pollution offenses seaward of
that twelve-mile boundary, the FWPCA should be enforced only against
vessels whose flag state is not a party to MARPOL 73/78. The United
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States should deal with vessels whose flag state is a state-party to
MARPOL 73/78 under the provisions of that convention. Any enforce-
ment against a flag state-party to MARPOL 73/78 beyond the provisions
of that convention should be done with that state's concurrence, and
subject to the safeguards in LOSC Part XII, Section 7. A coastal state's
hand is not necessarily tied by the LOSC. Where special circumstances
dictate more stringent pollution control is needed within a defined area
of the EEZ due to traffic, or certain ecological or oceanographical condi-
tions, a mechanism is in place under LOSC Article 211(6) where the
coastal state may enact more stringent regulations.
Consideration should also be given to amending the FWPCA to
define United States' enforcement jurisdiction over threatened or actual
significant damage to the marine environment or major damage to the
coastline or related interests (to mirror language in LOSC Article 220
(5) and (6), respectively) caused by vessel-source pollution incidents out
to 200 miles. This should include a proviso that that jurisdiction would
not be exercised unless the vessel's flag state concurs in the action, and
again, the action should be subjected to the safeguards provided for in
LOSC Part XII, section 7.
These amendments would 1) strengthen both the development of
the international law of the sea and the United States' desire to be a
leader in this area despite political problems with the LOSC, and 2) pro-
vide the United States, or any coastal state who chooses to follow suit,
with an extra tool to protect their coastal interests, always subjected,
however, to the concurrence of the offending vessels flag state. Should
the United States ultimately accede to the LOSC, these amendments
would seamlessly integrate into the LOSC regime.
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